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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the market for catastrophe event risk -- i.e., financial claims that are linked
to losses associated with natural hazards, such as hurricanes and earthquakes.  This market is in transition
as new approaches for transferring risk are being explored.  The paper studies several recent transactions
by USAA which use reinsurance capacity from capital markets, rather than only from reinsurers.  We
identify two puzzles concerning the cat protection purchased in these transactions: there is no coverage for
the largest, most severe events; and premiums appear well above actuarial value.  We demonstrate that
both features deviate from what theory would predict, yet are characteristic of many transactions, not
simply those of USAA.  We then explore a number of possible explanations for the facts.  The most
compelling are combinations of capital market imperfections and market power on the part of reinsurers.
Conclusions for broader capital market and risk management issues are discussed.
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Hurricanes, earthquakes, wind and ice storms, floods, etc. have long been known to cause
large and unexpected losses among owners of physical capital. Recently, it has become
more widely appreciated that a single hurricane or earthquake could result in damages of
well over $50billion.Given the growth rates in physical asset values and in population in
high-risk zones, distribution of catastrophe event losses continues to grow.
Because households are risk averse, they have a strong incentive to share their risks with
others through the purchase of insurance. Corporations —tothe extent they have a well-
foundered concern with risk management —alsohave an incentive to purchase insurance
and reinsurance. If these groups behave in a risk averse manner, then they treat severe
losses as expectationally more costly than moderate losses. Thus, one wouldexpect
insurance and reinsurance to focus on catastrophic outcomes. Moreover, since cat event
losses are uncorrelated with (and perhaps even independent of) financial wealth, the
premiums for such catastrophic pcotection should, if markets are perfect, be close to
expected losses.
This paper explores these propositions and the market for cat event risk by examining in
depth several recent reinsurance transactions completed for USAA, one of the largest
insurance companies in the US. These transactions have been widely discussed. They are
among the first to back reinsurance with dedicated collateral supplied by bondholders —
otherwiseknown as cat bonds. Traditionally, reinsurance has been backed by the general
credit of reinsurers, who use equity to fund a portfolio of reinsurance liabilities. We
demonstrate that these transactions display the two characteristics above: thatvery large
losses are not covered; and that premiums are very large compared with expected losses.
We then attempt to analyze these transaction features in two ways. First, we attempt to
show that they do indeed conflict with what equilibrium models would predict about the
profile and price of reinsurance coverage. Second, we provide evidence from a large
sample of reinsurance transactions, in order to put the clinical data points in perspective.
The large-sample evidence demonstrates that the USAAcoverage has had very much in
common with other, traditional reinsurance transactions.
The paper then turns to why this is the case: what could explain the widespread tendency
to underinsure (particularly for large events) and to set prices so high. We look at eight
different explanations. The majority of these focus on distortions on the supply side, but
several suggest problems with the demand side as well. The most important explanations
are supply-side stories of capital market imperfections facing reinsurers and the exercise
of market power by reinsurers.
The most interesting implications of the evidence we presentgo well beyond the cat risk
market itself. After all, cat risk will never be a very large standalone asset class. In the
conclusions, we discuss several lessons drawn from this evidence for the broader
behavior of capital markets and corporate risk management.2. Recent Reinsurance Contracts: Clinical Evidence
2.1. USAA: The company
To understand the developments in the traditional reinsurance market and the associated
risk transfer mechanisms, it is useful to investigate USAA's recent purchases of
reinsurance. USAA is the fifth largest privatepassenger automobile insurer and the
fourth largest homeowner insurer in the United States. It sells exclusively to U.S.
military officers and their families and is organized as a mutual insurancecompany.
Because of its military customer base, USAA has relatively little control over the
geographic pattern of its exposures that come disproportionately from California and
Florida.
The risk of Florida hurricane is a real one for USAA. In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew
swept through Florida and Louisiana, causing losses of $620 million to USAA and
approximately $17.9 billion to the insurance industry overall, of which 67% was
residential.2'3 Hurricane Andrew was by far the mostcostly insured cat event in the US
over the last 30 years, even when all loss figures are expressed in constant dollars. Small
changes in Andrew's trajectory would have resulted in major changes in total industry
and USAA losses.
2.1.2. USAA's 1997 reinsurance program
In many respects, USAA's catastrophe reinsuranceprogram looked like the programs of
other insurers. USAA purchased reinsurance in "excess-of-loss layers"conforming to
different cat-triggered loss amounts.4 The main parameters of an excess-of-losslayer are
the "retention," "limit," "exceedence" and "exhaustion" probabilities, and amount of
"coinsurance." The retention is just the deductible —thelevel that losses must exceed
before coverage is triggered. The probability that losses reach this level is the
exceedence probability. The contract limit is the maximumrecovery that can be made.
The probability of reaching a loss that exhausts the limit is the exhaustionprobability.
Most reinsurance contracts require that the cedent share, or coinsure,a portion of the
layer —usuallybetween 5%and20%. Coinsurance and positive retention levels help
diminish moral hazard and adverse selection. Essentially, reinsurance layersare call
spreads written on a company's underlying cat losses: long one call struck at the retention
or exceedence point, short one call struck at the retention plus limit, or exhaustion point.
The risk period for these contracts is typically oneyear.
USAA began contemplating alternatives to traditional reinsurance beginning in 1993.By
mid-1995, proposals had been requested from bankers on securitized risk transfer ideas.
2Source:John Major, "A Synthetic History of the Guy Carpenter Catastrophe Index," Guy Carpenter,
1997.
Dollar amounts in the text are in 1996 dollars unless stated otherwise. '
Onlypaid claims associated with event-triggered losses are reimbursable under standard cat reinsurance
contracts.
2By early 1996 USAA had selected three investment banks for the execution of a cat bond
transaction for the hurricane season beginning in July 1996. However, even though the
bankers had 4 or 5monthsto construct the transaction, it could not be completed that
year. Among the most important reasons were that: few investors understood the
securities; rating agencies had no established criteria on which to rate cat bonds;
regulators had to agree that Residential Re's noteholders were not, in fact, writing
insurance (something that they generally were not licensed to do); and legal, regulatory
and tax complications made finding the right location for the specialpurpose vehicle
complicated. Because of these problems, the issue did not come to market until mid-1997
for the risk period running from June 1997 to June 1998.
Figure 1 and Table 1 provide a simple depiction of the layers of USAA's 1997
reinsurance program. In prior years, USAA had purchased reinsurance to cover lossesup
to $1 billion only. In 1997 the company decided to extend its coverage up to losses of
$1.5 billion. It hoped to source this capacity directly from the capital markets. The
reasoning for doing so, according. to Steve Goldberg, the chief architect of USAA's
capital market's effort, was that "traditional reinsurance capacity is necessarily
limited..." and that "what was needed for USAA as well as other intermediaries was a
long term "supplement of additional capacity."5
2.1.3. Residential Re
As Figure 1 shows, the top-most layer was reinsured through the capital markets using an
independent, special purpose reinsurer called Residential Re. Residential Re's sole
purpose was to be an efficient provider of reinsurance to USAA; it would do no other
business. For tax and regulatory reasons, the company needed to be run entirely
independently of USAA. Residential Re provided a one-year reinsurance contract to
USAA, covering events which struck between the dates of June 16, 1997 and June 14,
1998. (See Figure 2 for a time-line.)
From USAA's perspective, the reinsurance contract written by Residential Re differed in
several respects from those commonly written by reinsurers. The first difference was that
the contract covered a single event only —USAAwould have the right to choose one and
only one event from the risk period. Typically, reinsurance contracts covered losses for
any number of events that breached the retention, until the limit was exhausted.6 The
second difference concerned credit risk. Residential Re's sole purpose was to write a
single reinsurance contract for USAA. It would dedicate collateral equal to the contract
limit. As a result, there was virtually no chance of default once a claim against the
contract was made. Traditional reinsurers did not fully collateralize individual contract
limits, and therefore could conceivably default on their obligations in sufficiently dire
states of nature,7
See Goldberg (1997). 6Traditionalreinsurance contracts often contain a reinstatement provision specifying that a new premium is
to be paid to extend additional coverage after the initial limit is exhausted. Often the reinstatement would
be mandatory. The Residential Re contract, however, had no reinstatement provisions.
For additional details on the Residential Re contract, See Froot and Seasholes (1997).
3Residential Re agreed to reimburse 80% of USAA's single-event cat losses between $1
billion and $1.5 billion, making the reinsurance contract limit $400 million (0.8 x ($1.5
billion -$1.0billion)). To collateralize this limit, Residential Re sold A-i and A-2 notes.
The A-2 notes, totaling $3 13 million, had all of their principal at risk. Thus, if an event
resulted in USAA losses exceeding $1.5 billion, USAA would receive $3 13 million from
A-2 noteholders' principal.
The A-i notes were slightly more complicated, as they blended part of an A-2 note with a
Treasury strip. This latter feature provided the A-is with principal protection.
Specifically, $164 million in A-i notes were sold. The A-i principal was then divided in
two parts. The first part was $87 million, which effectively went toward the purchase of
A-2 notes. The remaining $77 million went toward the purchase of 10-year US Treasury
strips with a maturity value of $164 million if an event occurred. The strips allowed A-I
holders to receive full principal repayment regardless of what happened. This meant that
the first $87 million would sustain losses pan passu with the A-2 notes. Thus, between
the A-is and A-2s, reinsurance collateral of $87 million + $313 million =$400million
was available from Residential Re to pay USAA's admissible event losses.
In order to have time to process insurance claims for disaster victims and therefore to
determine the extent of USAA losses, Residential Re notes featured a six-month extended
claims period. If no event occurred, the due date of the notes was June 14, 1998 —a1
year maturity. If an event did occur, however, USAA could elect to extend the notes'
maturity until December 15, 1998. During this time, USAA was to pay Residential Re an
additional half year's premium. The reinsurance contract, however, was not similarly
extended. Thus, if USAA elected to extend the notes, it wouldpay 1.5 years premium for
1 year of risk protection.
In return for the reinsurance, USAA agreed to pay Residential Re $24 million, or 6.0% of
the limit.8 After fees, noteholders received LIBOR plus 576 basis points for putting
funds at risk. Thus, A-2 and A-i holders received fractions (313/400 and 87/400,
respectively) of the premium based on capital at risk. For every dollar noteholders put at
risk of a one-year cat-event loss, they took out 5.76 cents in guaranteed premium.
2.1.4. Actuarial probabilities
The risk of loss to the reinsurance contract was modeled by Applied Insurance Research,
Inc. (AIR), one of several independent firms specializing in the probabilistic modeling of
catastrophic events. AIR (along with its main competitors, EQECAT and Risk
Management Solutions) model the climatology of atmospheric disturbances, the
geophysics of earthquakes, and the engineering of building structures, etc. They hire
actuaries, engineers, geophysicists, software specialists, and mathematicians. Using
Monte Carlo methods, AIR developed a probability distribution of losses for USAA's
specific portfolio on insured homes and autos, shown in Figure 3 below. AIR estimated
that the Residential Re layer had a 97 basis point probability of exceedence and a 39 basis
8Thisexcludes fees to USAA of approximately 100 basis points.
4point probability of exhaustion. The expected loss for the layer (i.e., the integral of the
probability of a given loss times the associated loss of principal) was estimated to be 63
basis points.
These actuarial estimates of expected loss stand in striking contrast to the size of the
premium. In equilibrium we would expect a zero-beta risk to have an expected return
equal to the riskfree rate. This implies that the theoretical spread over LIBOR for the cat-
event risk in the Residential Re layer is 63 basis points.9 In return for putting capital at
risk, investors received 576 / 63 =9.1times the actuarially fair premium!
When the issue came to market, it attracted considerable interest. The notes were
approximately 3 times oversubscribed. In the days following the issue, the yield fell from
576 basis points to the mid-400s, suggesting that there was indeed excess demand.
It also appeared that investors were not the only ones interested in providing this
reinsurance capacity. There were. unconfirmed rumors that a major cat reinsurer had
attempted to undercut the bond offering by promising to write the full reinsurance
contract for a lower premium, without the additional expenses or complications created
by these bonds.'°
2.2. CEA 1996
Such undercutting by a traditional reinsurer of a proposed cat bond offering had
happened before. In 1996 the State of California had decided to assemble a fund —the
California Earthquake Authority (CEA) —tohelp insurance companies finance potential
earthquake losses. In November 1996 the CEA announced that it had decided to purchase
reinsurance from National Indemnity, a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway. National
Indemnity is one of the world's largest reinsurers and easily the biggest single reinsurer
of "super-cats" (high incidence, low probability cat layers).
A purchase of traditional reinsurance was, however, not the expected outcome. Over the
prior year, California's insurance commissioner had solicited detailed proposals from
investment banks for a CEA cat bond. During the year the commissioner had chosen a
lead bank for the bond's issuance. This proposed CEA offering was similar to the USAA
transaction, though it was more than double its size. A CEA bond would have attracted
considerable attention as a watershed transaction. However, it was not to be. Just as the
investment bank's underwriting mandate was to be signed, National Indemnity
intervened, offering a lower premium than the bond would have required." The offer
Of course, LIBOR itself is not risk free and on average exceeds the US Treasury bill rate by on average
4Obp.Thereis, however, also some amount of credit risk associated with the special purpose vehicle.
Assuming that this credit risk charge is lower than that applied to major money-center banks, all our
computations are conservative by using LIBOR as the corresponding "risk-free" benchmark.
tOBasedon a private communication with Christopher McGhee, Managing Director, Marsh McLennan
Securities Corp.
The bonds would have incurred considerable incremental legal and modeling expenses as well as
transactional uncertainty due to the unprecedented nature of the transaction. This latter feature, in
5was particularly unusual given that the limit exceeded $1 billion, well in excess of the
limit a typical reinsurer would assume in a single transaction.
Why did National Indemnity attempt to undercut this transaction? Under the structure of
CEA's four-year reinsurance contract with National Indemnity the actuarially expected
loss was 1.7% and the limit $1.05 billion. In return for bearing the earthquake risk,
National Indemnity would receive an annual premium of $1 13 million —or6.3 times
actuarially expected losses of $1.8 million.'2 In fact, the terms were slightly better, as the
contract called for Berkshire Hathaway to receive all four annual premiums in the first
two years. Since the $1 .05 billion limit aggregates over the 4 year period, the gamble
effectively amounted to Berkshire putting up about $600 million in downside exposure
for a 93.4% chance to make about $400 million in premium.'3
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders seemed to agree that the CEA contract was a windfall
for their firm. The contract announcement appears to have increased Berkshire's stock
market valuation by almost $300 million, or 75 basis points in excess of the broad stock
market change.'4 Figure 4 demonstrates. This suggests that shareholders saw the CEA
reinsurance contract (and those that might follow) as being priced well above "fair"
value.
While information on Berkshire Hathaway's bidding tactics is understandably sketchy,
market participants acknowledge repeated interventions by the firm in undercutting
potential capital market transactions. As a very recent example, rumors are that, in early
July 1999, Berkshire Hathaway again underbid a potential $250 million cat bond issue,
by XL, a major Bermudan reinsurer. The bond issue was quite far along, but Berkshire
Hathaway made an eleventh-hour offer to provide all of the capacity in return for a
premium that was below the total cat bond costs to XL.'5
These tactics are now strongly associated with Berkshire Hathaway, and they have fueled
speculation among reinsurance specialists that Buffett attempted, but failed, to undercut
the 1997 Residential Re offering as well. Indeed, Buffett's annual letter to Berkshire
Hathaway shareholders has done little to dampen this speculation. In several of these
letters around the time of the offering, he alludes to the size of Berkshire's balance sheet
particular, may have influenced CEA's decision, given the insurance commissioner's status as a publicly
elected official.
12Theaverage annual premium for the 4 year aggregate cover was 10.75% of the annual limit, whereas the
likelihood that the reinsurance is triggered was 1.7%, according to EQE International, a catastrophe risk
modeling firm. This yields 10.75 / 1.7 =6.3premium times expected loss. '
Basedon a probability of 1.7% per year, the chance of no event over the four years is (9g3%)4 =93.4%.
Data in this paragraph are from IBNR Insurance Weekly (Volume III, #46), Dowling & Partners Securities,
LLC.
14Thecontract announcement by Berkshire Hathaway occurred on Friday 11/15/96, after market close. On
Monday, 11/18/96, Berkshire's class A shares closed at $33,200, up from Friday's close of $33,000 (total
equivalent class A shares outstanding were 1,210,762). Over the same period, the S&P 500 fell from
737.62 to 737.02.
ISPrivatecommunications with reinsurance brokers and investment bankers from Guy Carpenter, Goldman
Sachs, and Marsh McLennan Securities. Thanks to Christopher McGhee for bringing this to my attention.
6as being an important competitive advantage in reinsurance, allowing it to "move quickly
to seize investment opportunities."
2.3. Residential Re 1998 and 1999
In 1998 and 1999, Residential Re purchased reinsurance contracts from incarnations of
Residential Re that were nearly identical. The terms of the reinsurance have evolved
slightly over time, with important differences summarized in Table 2. All of the 1998 and
1999 notes were like the 1997 A-2s, in that all principal was at risk. There was therefore
no need for a Treasury strip or defeasance mechanism in the 1998 or 1999 programs.
The exposures covered by the policy were essentially the same, as USAA's underwriting
profile changed only marginally during this time.
Perhaps the most important difference in the notes was the premium received by
investors. It fell from 5.76% in 1997 to 4.12% in 1998 and to 3.66% in 1999. Although
not as well publicized, there was adecline in expected loss as well. As Table 2 shows,
the expected loss rate stood at 63 basis points in 1997; this fell to 52 basis points in 1998
and 44 basis points in 1999. Because expected losses declined, the ratio of premium to
expected loss fell by less than premiums —from9.1 in 1997 to 7.7 in 1998 and 8.3 in
1999.
The decline in expected loss appears surprising at the outset. During this period, property
values and construction prices rose somewhat, and there was a slight increase in the
number of units USAA insured. Thus, based on exposures alone, there was an increase of
approximately 5% in the expected loss for a 1%-likely event from 1997 to 1999. The
main reason for the decline was therefore not a change in exposure, but a set of
incremental changes made to the AIR model. The overall effect of these is shown in
Table 3. Changes were made in the way the model generates events, event paths, and
geographic windfield speeds. Changes were also made in the way the model estimates
damageability from high winds and storm surge, and estimates the demand surge (i.e., the
additional costs due to relative scarcity of contractors, materials, etc. in the aftermath of a
storm). These changes were important in that use of the 1997 AIR model for all years
would show an increase (rather than a decrease) in exposure and expected loss.'6
It is also interesting to note that the 1999 Residential Re contract limit is smaller —$200
million versus $400 million and $450 million for the 1997 and 1998 programs,
respectively. For the 1999 renewal, USAA is supplementing the Residential Re contract
by purchasing a nearly identical reinsurance contract for $250 million from traditional
reinsurers. Thus, between these two contracts USAA will in 1999 again be covering $450
million (i.e., 90%) of its single-event losses between $1.0 billion and $1.5 billion.
It is likely that USAA has bifurcated its 1999 coverage for several reasons. First, by
splitting the program, USAA may succeed in stimulating greater competition between the
16SeeResidential Reinsurance (1999) for more details. It is unclear which version of the model should be
used to evaluate each year's expected losses. We apply the version of the model that was current for each
year of the program. This assumes that the market thought the expectation of future revisions was zero.
7traditional reinsurance and cat securitization markets. Overall program costs would
therefore fall further by instituting such a split. Given the extent to which premiums for
traditional reinsurance have fallen over time (see the discussion below), there is a concern
that capital markets premiums would not otherwise decline as quickly.
There is some evidence to support the competition argument. The premium paid by
USAA for the $200 million 1999 Residential Re program was 3.66% received by
investors, plus 0.2 1% for a swap to deliver LIBOR and for minor day-count adjustments
(excluding fees). At the same time, USAA locked in a nearly-equal premium rate on the
$250 million traditional reinsurance portion of the 1999 program. This experience
differed from that of earlier years. In both 1997 and 1998, it was rumored that USAA
paid more for the Residential Re program than it would have for traditional reinsurance.
(Note this comparison does not take into account the differences in credit quality between
a collateralized special purpose vehicle and a standard reinsurance company, nor does it
take into account the additional fees required for the bond-financed program.) While
paying more may have been justified as an investment in developing the capacity of the
capital markets, the returns on further investments of this kind are likely to be low.
Second, while the 1997 and 1998 Residential Re notes were oversubscribed, there was
some concern about whether the same would be true in 1999. Large portions of the 1997
and 1998 programs were purchased by 2 large institutions. One of those dropped out in
1998, but the other, a single large hedge fund, reportedly increased its purchase
substantially that year. However, this hedge fund experienced severe financial
difficulties in the late summer and fall of 1998 and was unlikely to participate in 1999.
These developments, coupled with the lower reinsurance market premiums, may have led
to concerns about the success of a full $450 million issue of 1999 Residential Re notes.
3. Puzzles
The USAA transactions discussed above raise two basic puzzles for financial economists:
1) What explains USAA's purchase profile of reinsurance, with it buying protection for
relatively minor cats while remaining exposed for large cats?
2) Why do USAA's premiums appear to be so high?
We try to explain these puzzles in Section 3 below. However, before doing so, it is
useful first to gain some perspective. To do so we attempt to show that these features of
USAA's reinsurance are representative of the broader cat risk market.
3.1. The profile of reinsurance purchases
The first puzzle concerns the profile of protection purchased by USAA. It is clear from
Figure 1 that USAA purchases protection above a relatively small deductible. However,
8USAA has little protection for the largest and most severe catastrophes. (For rough
magnitudes, note from Figure 3 that the AIR model shows USAA looses $242 million
with probability 10% and $1 billion losses with probability 1% from hurricanes alone.)
Indeed, it was not until 1997 that USAA purchased reinsurance beyond the 1% level. Is
this what financial economists would expect as a risk management profile? What
determines the loss level beyond which such hedging is no longer economical?
3.1.1. The optimal reinsurance profile
The first question to ask is whether USAA's purchase profile in Figure 1 differs from an
optimal purchase profile, and if so, how. To do this, we derive the optimal reinsurance
purchase profile in a standard model of corporate hedging. Specifically, we apply the
framework of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993). The basic FSS approach is that value-
maximizing corporations face financing imperfections that make external capital more
expensive than internal capital. Corporate hedging can raise value to the extent that it
ensures that a corporation has sufficient internal funds available to take advantage of
attractive investment opportunities.
Following FSS, consider a value-maximizing firm that faces financing imperfections that
add to the cost of raising external funds. The future-period value of the firm is given by
P =P(w),where w measures the availability of internal capital. In the first period,
internal capital is a random variable, in that it depends on the future realization of cat
events.
The model has two time periods, present and future. In the present period, the insurer
makes a reinsurance (i.e., hedging) decision regarding its catastrophic exposures by
maximizing the expected value of the firm, E[P(w)]. The future period serves to close the
model: insurers realize cat event shocks and maximize shareholder value subject to the
financing imperfections they face going forward.
In the future period, a shock to the internal capital of the insurer is realized. Before
hedging, the future-period internal funds are w =w0s,where w0 is initial level of
internal capital, and £isthe random negative shock from a cat event, with SN(l,o2),
VsL 1].To keep things simple, we choose units such that w0 =1.Thus, if there is
no cat event, internal funds remain at 1.
In the first period, the insurer can purchase reinsurance against some range of event
losses. Specifically, we let the insurer choose a retention, r, and a limit, 1, which together
define a layer of insured s shocks, [r -1,r] c (co,1].For simplicity, we assume the
insurer buys complete reinsurance on this interval and that the reinsurance is fairly
priced. We also subject the insurer to a spending constraint, B, for premiums spent on the
layer.




where r- is the payment under the reinsurance contract when falls in the region [r -
r],and1 is the payment when £ is in the range [oo,r-1].
As stated above, the future-period value of the firm is given by P = P(w). Following
FSS, P is assumed to satisfy<O P ? 1. FSS prove that these conditions can be
derived from a costly-state verification model of external financing, provided that the
hazard rate of the distribution of E, g(E)I( 1 -F(E)), is strictly increasing.
In the first period, the insurer chooses the reinsurance it wishes to buy by maximizing
future value subject to the premium constraint:
maxEe[P(w(E))]
r (2) si. (r —E)dF(E)+ ldF(E) ￿ B
r—1 —x
Withoutthe budget constraint, the unconstrained insurer would set [r -1,r] =(oo,1]. In
other words, the limit would be infinite and the retention would be set at a loss of zero
(with no cat event, we have—= r=1).The insurer would therefore be fully hedged
against the cat shock. Clearly, the premium constraint is not binding unless B is strictly
less than the required premium for the unconstrained contract:
B< '(l-E)dF(E) . (3)
The first-order conditions with respect to r and 1 are therefore:





1PdF(E) rdF(S) = r1PWdF(E) r-1 (5)
Note that with the firm completely insured over the interval [r -1,r], w becomes a
constant over the corresponding range of E. Thus, w(r) =w(r - 1*),VEL[r-1*,re],
so P (w(r —1)) can be taken out of the integral on the left-hand side. Thus,
P(w(r-l))dF(E) 'P(w(s))dF(E). (6)
10Since P is negative, P(w(r—l))<J4,(w(E)), VE < r —l. In other words, the greatest
need to hedge, as measured by the marginal value of external funds, is greatest for the
most severe risks. The only way to satisfy the equality in equation (6) is to set ito -x
The spending constraint, because it is binding, then determines r e (-x,1].
Thus:
Proposition: When reinsurance is priced fairly, the optimal reinsurance profile protects
against unboundedly large events first; the benefit of hedging higher probability layers is
less. The retention is then set at lower loss levels as the spending constraint, B is
relaxed. The optimal layer satisfies [r* -l,r ]= (oo, Z], wherez< 1.
Figure 5 demonstrates the intuition for this result graphically. The shaded region shows
the optimal interval over which e is fully hedged. Larger risks are hedged fist, and the
retention, r, moves up continuousljas the spending limit is relaxed.
3.1.2. The aggregate profile of reinsurance purchases
USAA's profile of reinsurance purchases is clearly not what one gets out of a model of
corporate risk management. Is this profile common among insurance companies for their
purchases of cat reinsurance? In this subsection we examine insurer hedging of
catastrophe risk in the aggregate.
To determine the pattern of reinsurance purchases for a broad group of insurance
companies we apply actual reinsurance transaction data obtained from Guy Carpenter &
Co., the reinsurance brokerage subsidiary of Marsh McLennan Inc and by far the largest
US cat risk intermediary. These data include over 4,000 cat reinsurance layers for 22
nationwide insurers and a large number of regional insurers for the years 1970 to 1998,
all of which were brokered by Guy Carpenter & Co.'7
We use these data to calculate the fraction of aggregate insurer exposure that is reinsured
for different sized aggregate events. To do this, we must relate the losses on individual
contracts to aggregate cat event losses. For each contract, we link individual firm
retention and exhaustion loss amounts to a level of industry-wide losses. This is done
using data on US regional market shares for each firm and year from A.M. Best. So, for
example, a nationwide firm that has a 10% market share of cat-sensitive premiums is
calculated to incur 10% of the aggregate industry losses. For such a firm, a reinsurance
layer of $100 million (limit) in excess $150 million (retention) is calculated to provide
protection for industry-wide losses of between $1.5 billion and 2.5 billion.'8
17TheCEA reinsurance is not included in this data. Furthermore, only traditional reinsurance contracts are
used, so that USAA's reinsurance from Residential Re is not included.
This procedure was developed in Froot and O'Connell (1997) and is discussed in detail there.
11Figure 6 shows the relationship in these data between the fraction of pooled insurer
exposure covered by reinsurance and the size of industry-wide events.'9 The fraction of
coverage is based on marginal (not total) losses. So, for example, 50%coveragefor a $3
billion national event implies that one half of an additional dollar of loss at the $3 billion
level is covered by reinsurance.
There are two main points to be made from Figure 6. First, there is in the aggregate a
clear resemblance to USAA's individual purchase profile. Reinsurance coverage as a
fraction of exposure is high at first (after some small initial retention) and then declines
markedly with the size of the event, falling to a level of less than 30% for events of only
about $8 billion. Such events are not very large —aggregatestatistics suggest that an $8
billion event occurs annually with probability of about 9%. So only a small fraction of
large event exposures are covered, and if anything, Figure 6 overstates that fraction. That
is because the only insurers included in the data are those that actually purchase
reinsurance. The implication is that insurance companies overwhelmingly retain, rather
than share, their large-event risks.
This point needs to be expanded in an important way. Insurers themselves intermediate
only a small fraction of cat exposures. Many exposures faced by the corporate and
household sectors are retained. Corporations, for example, tend to self-insure, and
particularly so against large losses —evenwhile purchasing insurance against small
losses. Doherty and Smith (1993) document that insurance coverage is extremely limited
for corporate cat losses of between $10 million and $500 million (for a single
corporation) and virtually nonexistent for losses above $500 million. This suggests that
the hedging profile of USAA is typical not just of the insurance industry, but of corporate
insurance purchases as well. The vast majority of primitive cat risk in the economy is
being retained. This suggests that lack of complete risk sharing —andthe failure of the
insurance and reinsurance sector to help accomplish it —ison a scale even greater than
that shown in Figure 6.
There is a second point to take from Figure 6. A comparison of the reinsurance profiles
at different points in time suggests that retentions increase after a large event. To see this,
recall that between 1990 and 1994, Hurricane Andrew struck Florida and the Northridge
earthquake occurred in California. These were by some margin the two most costly
events since the 1960s. During this time period, Figure 6 shows that the fraction of
exposures reinsured for medium events (between $2 billion and $8 billion) increases,
while the fraction of exposures reinsured for small events (under $2 billion) actuallyfal/s.
This is unlike the changes that occurred in previous periods. One explanation is that
reinsurance contract retentions shifted upward. In other words, when coverage for large
events increases after an event, it appears to do so at least partly at the expense of small-
event coverage. We will provide further evidence on this point below.
3.2. Comparison with market-wide reinsurance prices
Event losses are in 1994 dollars.
12Next we turn to the prices paid by USAA and CEA for reinsurance. Strikingly high
though the premiums may be, it is useful to be clear about the appropriate benchmark. In
this section we consider two premium benchmarks: actuarially expected losses and
average premiums on other reinsurance contracts.
3.2.1. Actuarially expected losses as fair-value premiums
Our use of actuarially expected losses as the fair-value benchmark hinges on two
important assumptions. First, this benchmark clearly assumes that cat risk is diversifiable
in equilibrium. A sufficient condition would be that the cat risk returns are independent
of total wealth. Not surprisingly, the data on cat returns provide no evidence to reject this
independence assumption. It should be noted, however, that existing tests examine only
correlations (i.e., second and not higher moments) with other financial assets, finding
them to be zero. In addition, cat events have a clear and direct effect on nonfinancial
assets (e.g., housing), so correlations with financial assets may not tell the whole
story.20'2'
The second assumption we make in using actuarially expected loss as a benchmark is that
our estimate of loss is unbiased. While there is uncertainty about the true probabilities,
the presence of uncertainty, per Se, should not matter under expected utility theory.
Agents should care only about gamble outcomes provided they have unbiased estimates
of outcome probabilities.22 However, given the paucity of rich cat event data, there may
be a common bias in the estimated event probabilities made by the cat models. Even if
such a bias exists, it is hard understand why the capital market would think it knows more
about unbiased cat-event loss probabilities than do specialized cat modeling firms. As
long as the capital markets take the model expected losses to be unbiased based on
currently available information, our unbiasedness assumption is satisfied.
3.2.2. The aggregate pricing of cat reinsurance
The next question is whether these individual premiums are also representative of the cat
risk market. The quick answer is that they seem to fit well with historical data based on a
wide cross section of cat reinsurance contracts. To demonstrate this, we again apply
reinsurance contract data from Guy Carpenter and Company. As in the section above, we
link these individual contracts to industry-wide losses. To calculate each contract's
expected losses, however, we need an additional step. In order to assign probabilities of
loss we must estimate the frequency and severity distributions of cat events. Once we
20
SeeFroot, Murphy, Stern, and Usher (1995) and Litzenberger, Beaglehole, and Reynolds (1996). It is
worth noting that, because of low power, there is little to be gained from investigating higher-order
moments. Yet, because cat risk is highly non-normal even in continuous time, cat risk can easily alter the
higher-order moments of wealth. Fortunately, for risk exposures that are small in comparison with the risk
of total wealth, the effects of higher-order moments are small.
21Inaddition to the destruction of nonfinancial wealth, cat events also result in subsequent wealth transfers,
and even in wealth increases for some. For example, building contractors may work longer hours as a result
of a cat event.
22
SeeBantwal and Kunreuther (1999) for a discussion of departures from expected utility and its
implications for cat pricing.
13have estimated probabilities, it is straightforward to derive the estimated expected loss for
each contract.
Figure 7 depicts the ratio of premium to estimated expected loss across reinsurance
contracts. For comparison, we also graph an index of premiums relative to limit, a ratio
that, in reinsurance parlance, is known as "rate on line." Here rate on line is calculated as
the average across contracts of the ratio of premium to limit, and (for comparison
purposes only) is set equal to the premium-to-expected-loss curve in 1989. Note that rate
on line contains no calculation of expected loss, so it is immune to any measurement
errors in our methodology. Of course, rate on line is also unable to provide information
about shifts in retentions.
Figure 8 breaks down each treaty by layer, in order to measure premium to expected loss
by exceedence probability. Higher deciles represent lower exceedence probabilities.
Although not included in this database, the Residential Re and CEA layers discussed
above would fall into deciles 9 or 10.
Several points emerge from Figures 6 and 7. First, reinsurance became considerably
more expensive during the 1990s, with premiums rising by 3 times expected losses
between 1992 and 1993 alone (contract terms for each year are set in January). This
largest price increase coincides precisely with the occurrence of Hurricane Andrew in
August 1992.23 Because there were so few large storms (and none near the size of
Andrew) between 1970 and 1992, it is hard to find a historical analogue to this magnitude
of price increase. The next costliest US natural disaster since 1970 was the 1994
Northridge earthquake. Since that time only relatively minor insured cat losses have
occurred.
Second, note that industry-wide prices on reinsurance contracts seem to match almost
exactly the pricing of the 1996 CEA contract (at 6.3 times expected loss). And, if
anything, they appear somewhat low in comparison with Residential Re in all years.
Figure 8 offers an explanation for this. It shows that much of the high premium-to-
expected-loss ratio (which is an average across all layers) comes from the lower-
probability layers. Thus, as low-probability layers, USAA and CEA could be expected to
have somewhat higher premium-to-expected-loss ratios than the average contracts
graphed in Figure 7.
Third, note that prices have declined in 1998 by a factor of two from the post-Andrew-
Northridge level. The decline has occurred smoothly since 1994 when measured in terms
of rate on line. However, premium-to-expected-loss fell strongly only in 1998. The
reason for this disparity is that the premium-to-expected-loss curve picks up changes in
retention levels. As mentioned above, retention levels rose in the post-Andrew period,
1992 to 1994. From 1994 to 1997, it appears that retentions continued to rise, insofar as
23HurricaneAndrew and the Northridge earthquake resulted in roughly $20 billion and $13 billion,
respectively, in industry-wide damages.
14the rate on line curve declines while the premium-to-expected-loss curve does not. Only
in 1998 do retentions begin to fall.24
Fourth, Figure 7 suggests a cyclical price path triggered by large events. It is argued that
similar price cycles are observed in other insurance markets.25 So even though there are
not many comparable cat events in the US record, there is a strong presumption in the
catastrophe marketplace that these price fluctuations are part of a kind of price "cycle."
Fifth, given the paucity of event data, one should naturally be skeptical of our (or any)
estimates expected loss. After all, there is by definition little empirical information on
rare catastrophic events. Even though our estimates agree broadly with those of the
disaster-modeling firms, which employ different methodologies, it is possible that —
acrossmethodologies —thereis a systematic underestimation of true expected losses.26 If
true, this would lead us to overstate the cost of cat reinsurance.
However, one might argue that even if the level of our estimates is in error, it is unlikely
that the price changes in Figure 7 are prone to large errors. It seems hard to argue that
rationally-estimated expected losses increased and then decreased so substantially over
such a short period of time. If an event occurred that was thought to be of low
probability, a good Bayesian with little prior information might indeed update the
probability of reoccurrence. However, nonoccurrence of such an event would give such
a Bayesian little new information since the event was unlikely to occur in the first place.
Thus, it is hard to understand how any rational scheme for estimating probabilities would
yield a precipitous decline as a result of a non-event. We discuss a number of hypotheses
that might explain the behavior of prices in the next section.
Before leaving this point, it is interesting to note that revisions of the AIR model for
constant USAA exposures downwardly adjust expected losses during this time period.
Table 3 shows the decline in the event-loss distribution between the 1997 and 1999 AIR
models. Even though exposure sizes increased, expected losses from the 100 basis point
to 40 basis point levels of likelihoodfell by between 10% and 14% due to model revision.
While the timing of this decline may be coincidental, it is interesting to introspect on
whether these same model revisions would have been implemented were a major cat
event to have taken place during this period.27
24Thereis preliminary evidencefromtheJanuary 1999 cat reinsurance renewals that premiums and
retentionshave both continued to fall.
25Forevidence of price cycles in insurance, see for example, Gron (1994).
26Catmodeling firms use complex Monte Carlo simulations with many sources of uncertainty and many
parameterized distributions. Nevertheless they also can work only with historical data which is highly
limited. For investigations of the uncertainty in cat event model estimates, see Bantwal and Kunreuther
(1999), Major (1999), and Moore (1998).
27Thereis no suggestion by AIR that these changes are correlated at all with recent cat-event activity.
Model refinements are a continuing process. During this two-year period, changes in the windfield
generation module of the model accounted for much of the decline in expected loss. This module "was
enhanced to provide for smoother transitions between the filling rates from one region to another and to
update surface friction factors.... In addition, an updated coastline [data] file was implemented..."
(Residential Re 1999 offering circular, p. 47). Both changes reduced expected losses, but neither is
explicitly motivated by recent event occurrence.
15Even with the model changes, the USAA ratio of premium-to-expected-loss ratio
declines. However, it does so only slightly, falling from 9.1 in 1997 to 8.3 in 1999.
Thus, recent premiums do appear to decline when changes in expected losses are taken
into account. But the changes in the AIR model leave one suspicious about how much
weight the modeling process places on very recent (non) events. Much of what appears
to be a change in premium-to-expected-loss ratios in Figure 7 may instead be a change in
perceived event probabilities.
3.3. Summary
To conclude, the agreement between different measures of expected loss in Figure 7, and
the CEA and USAA contracts is strong. It seems clear that the two puzzling aspects of
these layers —therelatively small amount of reinsurance for large events and high prices
—havebeen pervasive across the catastrophe risk market. In the next section, we
consider a number of different explanations that may help explain these puzzles. The
goal here is not to provide comprehensive evidence on each of these possible
explanations, but to identify and clarify hypotheses.
4. Explanations and Interpretations28
Our explanations are of two types: those that affect supply and those that affect demand.
Taking the two findings above as given —thatreinsurance quantities are low and prices
high —naturallysuggests some form of supply restriction. However, there is unlikely to
be a single explanation, and several demand-related explanations appear to be supported
by some of the evidence as well. Thus, we consider factors that affect both demand and
supply.
4.1. Explanation 1: Insufficient capital in reinsurance
Perhaps the supply of reinsurance is low because catastrophic risk-taking capital is
somehow inhibited. In other words, there may be financing imperfections similar to that
in the model above. Such capacity shortfalls, even if relatively temporary, might exist for
a number of structural reasons: it may be costly for existing reinsurers to raise additional
funds in the capital markets; it may be hard to find investors who expect appropriate
"equilibrium" rewards for bearing catastrophic risks; it may also be that it is costly for
reinsurers to hold large amounts of collateral on their balance sheets. What is the
evidence that reinsurance capital is in short supply?
First, judging from Warren Buffett's writings, shortages of capital appear to be an
important rationale for Berkshire Hathaway's reinsurance strategy. In his 1996 letter to
shareholders, Buffett observes,
"Our ...competitiveadvantage [in writing "supercat" risks] is that we can provide
dollar coverages of a size neither matched nor approached elsewhere in the
28Partsof this section draw upon Froot (1999a).
16industry. Insurers looking for huge covers know that a single call to Berkshire
will produce a firm and immediate offering."
Perfect access to capital by new and existing reinsurers would remove this "competitive
advantage." So it seems Buffett believes in —andpursues a strategy of exploiting —
capitalshortfalls.
Buffett's strategy is also predicated on a perception that a capacity shortage may become
temporarily worse, for example, if reinsurer capital is depleted by a large event. A
temporary shortage would be consistent with the post-event cycle suggested by Figure 7,
wherein prices rise and then fall while quantities fall and then rise. Again from Berkshire
Hathaway's 1996 annual report, Buffett writes:
"After a mega-catastrophe, insurers might well find it difficult to obtain
reinsurance even though their need for coverage would then be particularly
great. At such a time ...itwill naturally be [Berkshire's] long-standing
clients that have first call on it. That business reality has made major
insurers and reinsurers throughout the world realize the desirability of
doing business with us. Indeed, we are currently getting sizable 'stand-
by fees from reinsurers that are simply nailing down their ability to get
coverage from us should the market tighten."
Buffett seems to be saying that the prospect of a capital shortage in the aftermath of a
major cat event motivates insurers to purchase 'capacity' protection. Note that this is not
protection against an increase in prices —presumablyNational Indemnity's clients would
pay the going market rate —butprotection against being excluded from the marketplace.
The price of a guarantee to participate in a well-functioning marketplace should be zero.
In both of these quotes, and in other discussions of "supercat" risks in Berkshire
Hathaway annual reports from 1995, 1996, and 1997, Buffett emphasizes the value to
Berkshire's shareholders of the company's substantial balance sheet. In a world of
costless access to external finance, a balance sheet earns no rents by virtue of its size. It
therefore ought to bestow no competitive advantage on those who control them.
Buffett's emphasis on quantity shortages, and not price increases, is important for making
an argument on financial imperfections. It is consistent with the low level of risk transfer
and post-event decline in quantities —bothshown in Figure 6. It also avoids reliance on
the price evidence we have seen so far (e.g., Figures 6 and 7). As we mentioned above,
this price evidence can be distorted by unobserved variation in subjective event
probabilities (such as those driving the updates in the AIR model). It is the weakest link
in the argument. So isn't there a way to test whether prices comove inversely with
quantities, in a way that is not subject to the probability-updating critique? If so, we
would have more decisive evidence that capacity shifts lie behind price movements and
levels.
17It turns out the answer to this question is yes. Suppose we were to observe a large
hurricane that subsequently increased reinsurance premiums. The probability updating
hypothesis would say that the change is due to learning about the future damages
associated with hurricanes (fully rational or not). We would therefore expect the
premiums on hurricane risk to change, and probably to rise. At the same time, would we
have learned nothing about the probabilities of loss on independent perils, such as
earthquakes. Thus, under the probability updating hypothesis, the premiums on
earthquake risk in California should remain constant. Alternatively if the post-hurricane
price increase is a result of capital market imperfections, we would expect an increase in
both hurricane and earthquake premiums. Thus, if we can divide up the post-event
cross-section into different peril combinations, we can perform a kind of event study to
better test the comovement of prices and quantities.
Table 3 provides the results of such an event study. The table shows both price and
quantity responses in reinsurance purchased during the year following hurricane Andrew.
As before, reinsurance quantity is measured as actuarially expected loss. We already
know that in aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, reinsurance purchases fell, and that this
occurred primarily through an increase in retentions. Table 3 adds the fact that the
quantity purchasedfell by more —andthe premium paid rose by more —forthose insurers
that had greater exposure to the Southeastern US and to hurricanes wherever they occur.
Thus, across contracts, prices rise most where quantities decline most. It seems hard to
explain this fact by a subjective increase in probabilities, provided that the probability
increases retain some bearing to the information revealed in the event. Thus, while there
may be some probability updating that we cannot capture in our unconditional estimates
of expected loss, there also appears to be a strong element of true price increase. This can
only be explained by a temporary, shift backward in the supply of capital.
Of course, it is not surprising that the supply of cat risk bearing capital is momentarily
restricted immediately following an event. Large-event losses deplete reinsurer capital
and surplus and, realistically, require at least a short amount time to replenish. However,
6 years elapsed between Andrew and the first declines in the premium-to-expected-loss
ratios in Figure 7. The timing therefore also seems consistent with the hypothesis that
frictions retard capital flows into the reinsurance sector.29
The final point in this section is that there is a kind of irony in the financing
imperfections story as applied to insurance and reinsurance: much primitive cat risk could
be reduced through investments in mitigation, investments that would appear to pay high
actuarial returns. However, many of these investments are not made because they require
individuals and corporations, who have scarce capital themselves, to raise (or deplete
internal) capital. Thus, capital market shortages may in part be responsible for the large
29Itis common in the industry for reinsurers to require "paybacks" for event losses and to do so through
higher premiums and retentions. Note that there is nothing in this practice, to the extent it explains the
data, to contradict explanation #1. However, an important question remains as to why this kind of
contracting prevails and what it tells us about reinsurance markets. See explanation #5belowfor one
potential answer.
18and growing risk pooi needing insurance and reinsurance. Without capital shortages,
reinsurance capacity could costlessly be greater, but there would also be fewer risks to
reinsure in the first place.3°
To conclude, the post-Andrew decline in premiums has not altogether escaped Warren
Buffett's attention. He offers his own explanation in his 1997 annual letter:
"Many investors who are 'innocents' —meaningthat they rely on representations
of salespeople rather than on underwriting knowledge of their own —havecome
into the reinsurance business by means of purchasing pieces of paper that are
called 'catastrophe bonds.' ...Theinflux of 'investor' money into catastrophe
bonds —whichmay well live up to their name —hascaused super-cat prices to
deteriorate materially."
Clearly, Buffett believes that a capacity expansion, not a change in true probabilities, is
the cause for the decline in premiums. Understandable, but less than fully credible, is his
claim that this expansion is the result of misinformation rather than better risk sharing
and greater competition.
4.2. Explanation 2: Reinsurers have market power
A number of observers have suggested that the evidence on prices and quantities above
might be explained by market power rather than by a capital shortage per se. Under this
explanation, prices rise and quantities decline not because reinsurance capital is
impossible or costly to obtain, but because existing reinsurers have no incentive to
increase their capital. By putting less money at risk and preventing new entry, incumbent
reinsurers keep prices high. Some observers, such as James M. Stone of Plymouth Rock
Company (a former Harvard Professor of Economics and Massachusetts Insurance
Commissioner), argue that market power among reinsurers is the main reason that
catastrophe reinsurance has proved a more attractive business than insurance.
Of course, it is very hard to provide evidence that market power among reinsurers has
increased secularly over time or cyclically in the aftermath of events. There is a general
view that the reinsurance industry has been consolidating. There has been a distinct drop,
for example, in the number of Lloyd's syndicates since the 1 960s and 1 970s. There has
also been an increase over time in the capital and market share of large reinsurers.
However, these facts aren't necessarily associated with increased market power in setting
prices or restricting supply. For example, even though there are fewer Lloyd's
syndicates, catastrophic risk pricing is not typically determined by individual syndicates.
Furthermore, while consolidation has occurred in the industry, greater market power need
not be the driving force. Consolidation may result from economies of scale. The
information-intensity of reinsurance is one possible source of scale economies. For
30SeeHoward Kunreuther and Paul Kleindorfer, "Challenges facing the insurance industry in managing
catastrophe risks," NBER conference on The Financing of Property/Casualty Risks.
19example, there may be high fixed costs of developing analytic capabilities and systems.3'
Once these systems are in place, optimal reinsurer size grows as the required investment
in fixed-cost systems increases. Consolidation may also be an efficient industry response
to costs of obtaining outside capital. If those costs are partially fixed, or proportionately
decline with size, the amount of outside capital may also be a source of increasing
returns.
Barriers to entry are another place to look for market power. Clearly, the barriers to
buying a cat bond are lower than the barriers to underwriting reinsurance. This is not
surprising, given that the cedent does not bear the bondholder's credit risk, but is forced
to bear the reinsurance underwriter's credit risk. Even so, there is considerable evidence
of entry into reinsurance in the 1 990s. For example, beginning in 1993 at least 6 major
reinsurance companies were formed in Bermuda, representing over $7 billion in new
reinsurance capital. (The first of these companies, Ace, XL, and Mid Ocean Re, were
organized prior to Hurricane Andrew, and so cannot be construed as a response to that
event, per se.) While the barriers to entry may be high for some agents (e.g., individual
or institutional investors), Bermuda is evidence that the barriers are not uniformly high
for all groups.
Still, it is interesting to speculate about the role of market power in the steep 1998 price
decline shown in Figure 7. After all, not much new capital was injected into traditional
reinsurers in 1997 or 1998. It's true that during this time, reinsurer balance sheets grew
marginally with premiums and interest, while experiencing trivial event losses. But the
same was true for each year since 1994. Similarly, the cat bonds issued in 1997 and 1998
may have been innovative, but they accounted at most for only a few percent of total cat
reinsurance treaties (based on limit). Thus, there has been surprisingly little change in
reinsurance capacity since 1995.
Probably the best explanation for the magnitude and timing of the recent price decline is
a change not in capacity, but in conrestability. While a large amount of new capacity
may be needed to drive down prices in a competitive market, the same is not truewhen
producers are perceived to have market power. In that case, all that is required is to
increase the perceived level of competition. This fits with the cat bond experience. While
cat bond issuance has been quite small, it began to seem intensely interesting and
important beginning in mid 1997 with Residential Re I. Furthermore, Warren Buffett's
final remark in the previous subsection seems to assign disproportionate importance to
cat bonds; it is hard to imagine Buffett going out of his way to acknowledge (and
discredit) other traditional sources of cat capacity at all, never mind a source of such tiny
size. The conclusion we draw is that cat bonds have affected markets well beyond the
size of the actual issues. It seems market power stories can explain a few of the facts we
have identified, and therefore ought to be taken seriously.
4.3. Explanation 3: The corporate form for reinsurance is inefficient
31Commentsby Stewart Myers, in Froot (1999b), pp. 434-437.
20Under this explanation, the corporate organizational form of reinsurers is unnecessarily
costly. Observers of corporate governance often point out that there are costs associated
with discretion given to managers to run a business. In principal, managers could pursue
objectives other than value maximization. It may be difficult for shareholders to identify
and discipline this behavior. Even if most managers are benevolent, the prospect that a
bad manager might use his agency relationship against shareholders reduces stock prices
and drives up the cost of capital.
This generic corporate finance argument of "agency costs" has application in a number of
arenas. First, it clearly can be applied to insurers and reinsurers. Many of the details of
the reinsurance business and the specific contracts are not transparent to arm's-length
capital providers. And, given the occasional-big-loss nature of reinsurance, it takes many
years to evaluate management efficacy and true business profitability. In reinsurance,
managers may have an unusually large incentive to gain market share (and increase their
size) by cutting premiums beyond that called for by shareholder value maximization.
How costly is it to delegate discretion to managers? This is generally a difficult question
to answer. However, for some narrowly-defined businesses it is possible to get a partial
answer. Closed-end funds are one such business. Closed-end funds invest in publicly
traded securities and then sell stakes in their portfolio to shareholders, much like mutual
funds do. However, unlike "open-ended" funds, closed-end-fund portfolios are not
affected by fund purchases or redemptions; shareholders buy and sell shares among one
another, without the fund involved. Thus, the price of the closed-end-fund shares, like
the price of most traded stocks, must find its own value in the marketplace in accord with
supply and demand.
As is well known, there is a puzzle associated with closed-end fund shares: their prices
are, on average, considerably below their net asset values.32 This cannot happen with
open-ended fund shares. Closed-end share discounts average about lO%-20%, and are
fairly pervasive across funds and over time. It is often argued that agency costs account
for these discounts.33 The agency story is that closed-end funds must pay an average
return in excess of what would be required for holding the underlying net assets. The
reason is that shareholders can't directly observe or discipline managers. Thus there is a
bias toward managerial decisions that put the managers' interests above those of
shareholders.
The agency cost argument may explain why the costs of reinsurance capital, and by
inference, reinsurance prices, are high. The argument is buttressed by two regularities.
The first is that reinsurance managers regard their capital costs as "equity-like" —i.e.,as
requiring a return considerably above US Treasury rates. An actuarially fair premium is
viewed as beneath the hurdle rate imposed by shareholders. Yet, given that catastrophe
risks are uncorrelated with those of other financial assets, shareholders' required returns
on cat risk should, as argued above, be low. Agency costs may be one factor forcing up
required returns. The agency cost explanation may therefore help understand the view in
32
SeeLee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) for a general discussion ofthe closed-end fund puzzle.
Citation?
21the industry that, for many risks, there is "too much" capital and that prices are "too low."
Indeed, some public reinsurers have recently been repurchasing stock on the argument
that premiums are too low, and therefore do not meet shareholders hurdle rate.
There is a second regularity behind the view that reinsurers are an inefficient corporate
form. This is that, even without agency costs, there is evidence that shareholders expect
reinsurer equity returns to be well above US Treasury rates. Evidence for this comes from
the behavior of stock prices of public Bermudan reinsurers, such as Mid-Ocean Ltd.
(recently purchased by XL), Renaissance Re, and Partner Re. These firms hold large
property/catastrophe liabilities, and historically have held assets in the form of short-term
notes and bills. Neither their assets nor liabilities are correlated with the stock market,
yet their share prices comove positively with the stock market. Specifically, a 10%
increase in the level of the S&P 500 is associated with an increase in the average value of
these firms of about We cannot identify a source of this comovement that
emanates from the companies themselves.
While it is interesting to speculate on the source of this distortion (e.g., noise, liquidity,
etc.?), the point here is to ask how reinsurance managers ought to respond. Clearly,
investors should require a higher return on these stocks ftheirprices will move with the
market. And, as a result, value maximizing reinsurance managers should inherit higher
hurdle rates, setting premiums above actuarial value.35 This argument suggests that
equity-financed reinsurance may be inefficient even in the absence of agency costs. If
equity capital requires a high return and reinsurer assets and liabilities contain no broad
equity market risks, then equity is an expensive form of capital, pure and simple. And if
reinsurance is financed in an expensive manner, reinsurance prices will be high.
Note the relationship between this argument and explanation I above. Reinsurance
companies may experience financial distress and other deadweight costs of raising
outside capital. Such costs clearly add to the cost of capital, thereby driving up
reinsurance premiums. This story is really a version of explanation 1, but it can also be
construed as an inefficiency in reinsurers' corporate form. What we have added to this
under explanation 3 is that an inefficiency in equity markets may be responsible for the
added costs.
Offsetting our arguments about inefficiency, however, is a view articulated by Roberto
Mendoza of J.P. Morgan. The view is, first, that Bermuda's zero rate of corporate income
tax reduces reinsurers' costs of equity. With no income tax, reinsurers would gain little
by substituting debt for equity finance, since there are no interest tax deductions available
to them in the first place. Furthermore, Bermudan reinsurers provide shareholders with an
Data on unadjusted stock betas from Bloomberg.
Of course, if it were feasible, the first-best response would be to remove the underlying distortion
altogether. If, for example, the market exposures of the stock prices were immutable and fixed, then it
would be best for managers to increase the equity exposure of their assets, so that the firms' true asset betas
corresponded with the fixed betas assigned by the market. Then there would be no need to increase the
hurdle rate on cat reinsurance. Alternatively, managers could potentially substitute debt finance for equity
to avoid the "high" costs of equity.
22opportunity to achieve tax-free compounding on invested capital. This tends tolower the
cost of equity relative to what it would otherwise be.
Second, Mendoza argues that managerial discretion may provide an "agency benefit" in
the case of cat reinsurance. In a highly inefficient and specialized market, shareholders
need an experienced agent to cherry picking risk-writing opportunities.36 In this case, the
present value of the managerial discretion is positive, sinceit allows shareholders to
exploit reinsurance market inefficiencies.
If true, Mendoza's arguments suggest that the corporate form of reinsurers, particularly
those in Bermuda, is actually a highly efficient delivery mechanism for reinsurance risk.
4.4. Explanation 4: The frictional costs of reinsurance are high
This explanation says that prices are high because, as financial instruments, reinsurance
contracts are illiquid, have high transactions costs, brokerage, etc. These sources of
friction imply that there are important costs in getting capital and reinsurance contracts
together in a repository called a reinsurer.
There is abundant evidence that illiquid assets trade at significant discounts. Letter stock,
as one example, typically trades at discounts of 25%versuspublicly-traded stock; on-the-
run bonds trade at significant premiums versus less liquid off-the-run bonds;and so on.
However, illiquidity of one-year reinsurance contracts is not enough to drive up
premiums. Part of the reason for capitalizing reinsurers who hold short-term notesfor
assets is to enable reinsurers to provide liquidity to insurers' risk exposures. In order to
raise reinsurers' cost of capital, their own placements would need to be discounted for
illiquidity. This may arguably have been the case for Lloyd's commitmentsfrom
individual names; it is far less compelling for publicly traded reinsurers in Europe, the
US, and Bermuda.
Other frictions such as brokerage costs and servicing expenses can legitimately raise the
cost of procuring reinsurance. However, these costs are not out of line with other
financing charges. For example, in the National Indemnity transaction described above,
annual brokerage fees were less than 1% of premium, and therefore, were about 11 bp of
limit. If the reinsurance had been issued as a capital market instrument, as had been
anticipated by some, these costs would have amounted to about 5% of annual premium,
or approximately SSbp of limit.In fact, the fees associated with 1997 Residential Re
bond offerings came to approximately I OObp of limit.37 Thus, if anything, the traditional
reinsurance brokerage and issuance expenses are lower than standard capital-market fees.
Furthermore, the high level of prices seems well above anything that can be explained by
brokerage and underwriting costs. Even if brokerage and underwriting expenseshad
come to a high of 10% of premium in the National Indemnity deal, completeelimination
36Ofcourse, the same argument is often made in defense of closed-end fund managers.
See Moore (1998).
23of these expenses would have driven down the multiple of premium relative to actuarially
expected losses by about 0.6 from 5.3to4.7. Brokerage and underwriting expenses
cannot explain observed price levels.
Another kind of frictional inefficiency is the means by which reinsurers manage risk.
Reinsurers manage their risk by aggregate (notional) limits, rather than exposures. For
example, a reinsurer might decide it will risk up to $100 million on Florida, but without
specifying the distribution of Florida losses on contracts written, or the covariance of
Florida losses with potential losses on its North Carolina contracts. Removing such
portfolio inefficiencies could have a substantial impact on the cost of risk transfer.
Better reinsurer risk allocation can reduce the cost of capital if reinsurers face financing
imperfections, as in explanation 1. A poorly diversified portfolio of reinsurance adds
needlessly to risk, and risk to internal capital is costly if there are financing
imperfections. As a result, there is a kind of interaction effect between this explanation
and explanation 1 above: costs of external finance can magnify the impact of poor
diversification on reinsurer capital costs. This might be a more promising place to look
for frictional inefficiencies in reinsurance intermediation, but only if one accepts the
notion of financing imperfections in the first place.
4.5. Explanation 5: Markets are degraded by moral hazard and adverse selection
Moral hazard and adverse selection are often singled out as distortions that prevent
markets from functioning efficiently. In general these distortions suggest that risks
should be disproportionately borne by those who control them and/or know them best.
Clearly, these effects restrict reinsurance supply. So they may help explain some of the
facts we observe. 38
Marketparticipants also claim that there is evidence for the presence of moral hazard and
adverse selection in reinsurance market conventions. Often an explicit reinsurance
contract contains an implicit agreement that reinsurers will charge more in the aftermath
of a claim and that the cedent will continue to buy reinsurance from the same
underwriter. Under this interpretation, property / catastrophe reinsurance is an implicit
form of "finite" reinsurance. Finite reinsurance does not so much transfer risk from the
cedent, as it finances the cedent. During an event, the reinsurer makes funds available,
expecting to be paid back later through higher subsequent premiums. In its purist form,
the arrangement is just event-contingent borrowing.39
This interpretation of our evidence of cat reinsurance is interesting and far-reaching.
First, it suggests that there may be even less risk transfer than we thought. The numbers
in Figure 6, for example, are overstated, since they do not account for the present value of
38Insome circumstances, higher prices may actually exacerbate the problem, making it impossible for the
market to function. For a discussion of the implications of adverse selection on reinsurance contracts, see
David Cutler and Richard Zeckhauser (1999).
The contingent credit arranged for the Nationwide by J.P. Morgan has many of these features.
24claim repayment. Second, the price and retention cycle we have seen subsequent to
Hurricane Andrew are not evidence of explanations 1, 2, 3 or 4. Instead, they become
evidence of a kind of "repayment cycle," where post-event periods are characterized by
more rapid repayment for past claims.
While it has a number of virtues in explaining the evidence, this explanation has two
basic flaws. First, there is the question of time-consistency. What disciplines a cedent
from switching reinsurers after making a claim? Since there is no contractual obligation
to the original underwriter(s), the only way reinsurers could enforce repayment is through
implicit collusion and barriers to entry into reinsurance. And, as we have already seen,
market power by itself (even in the absence of moral hazard and adverse selection) can
go a long way toward explaining the facts. This does not rule out explanation 5,itonly
says that believers have to acknowledge support for explanation 2 as well.
Second, moral hazard and adverse selection seem relatively harmless for cat reinsurance
as compared with other forms of insurance and reinsurance. Product liability protection,
for example, can be understandably plagued with asymmetric information and moral
hazard. Given the disclosure requirements, the large number of small risk units (i.e.,
houses, autos, etc.), and the presence of third-party modeling expertise for cat risk, it is
hard to see how these distortions could be important.
Finally, the high deductible and coinsurance in virtually all of these contracts reduces the
scope for moral hazard and adverse selection. Indeed, the evidence in Figure 8 suggests
that the pricing is most elevated at high layers where exceedence probabilities are low.
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems would not predict this. Indeed, retentions
and lows layers ought to be the most affected by moral hazard and adverse selection, so
these effects imply that lower layers should less efficient.
4.6. Explanation 6: Insurance regulation discourages the purchase of reinsurance
This explanation begins with the observation that many states use regulatory barriers to
keep insurance prices down. In some states, lines of business, and specific geographic
areas, insurers must underwrite the cat component of risk at prices that are well below
those that are actuarially and financially profitable. This is perhaps not a surprising state
of affairs given that insurance commissioners are publicly elected officials in 12 states,
including California and Florida.
Clearly this story cannot explain a high level of prices in the reinsurance market.
However, it can explain why there is so little reinsurance purchased, even if prices are
actuarially fair. The basic reasoning is that if insurers are unable to earn a profitable
return by underwriting risk, they need to cut costs. One way of cutting costs is to avoid
purchasing reinsurance in a way that is consistent with profit maximization.
The mechanism here is similar to that of rent control. Rent control makes housing
cheaper in the short run. But in the longer run, it cannot affect the equilibrium rental rate.
25Thus, if rents can't adjust upward, the value of the housing stock adjusts downward
through depreciation in quality.
In response to price controls, value-maximizing insurers will necessarily produce a
product that has lower quality and higher risk. Price controls reduce going-concern value
and increase insurer leverage considerably.4° Insurer equity becomes more like an out-of-
the-money option. As a result, the demand to hedge risk with reinsurance is reduced. The
result is that state guarantee funds must bear considerably greater risks that a large
catastrophe will become their responsibility or the responsibility of policyholders,
taxpayers, and/or remaining insurers. In short, everyone suffers if regulation makes it
unprofitable for insurers to provide high quality insurance contracts.
This explanation fits the cyclical behavior of quantities in addition to their low average
level. After a big event, there is political pressure to expand the scope of insurance
without raising its cost. If prices are cut through the regulatory process, insurers will cut
back on reinsurance purchases, even if the reinsurance is offered at a fair price.
The major weakness of this explanation is that it cannot explain high reinsurance
premiums. However, it does explain why insurers may perceive reinsurance prices as
"high," i.e., in excess of what they can profitably afford to pay.
4.7. Explanation 7: Ex-post intervention by third-parties substitutes for insurance
Ex-post financing of catastrophes occurs when other parties step in to transfer funds to
those who experienced event losses. Chief among these entities is, of course, the US
government. As is well known, the government has a major role in funding disasters at
both state and federal levels, through a number of agencies, and through both the
executive and legislative branches. Since the late 1970s, the Federal government has
spent annually an average of $8 billion (current) dollars on disaster assistance. This is far
greater than the average annual loss borne by reinsurers on US catastrophe coverage. In
some forms of disasters, notably floods, the federal government has effectively
•eliminated the incentive for private insurance contracts. Indeed, before the Federal
government stepped in to provide disaster relief, private insurers did offer flood
insurance.4'
The federal government is not the only entity involved in ex-post financing of
catastrophes. State guarantee funds are often the next line of defense if an insurer is
unable to meet its policy liabilities. And if the state fund is exhausted, then solvent
insurance companies are often required to make up the difference. This creates two types
of bad incentives. First, companies have an incentive to shift the burden onto the fund or
other insurers before the fund is exhausted. Second, companies who do not act to shift
high layer losses onto the pool are themselves likely to have to pay for others. Well-
behaved insurers will wish to avoid doing business in states with guarantees funds and
4°Evenwithout debt capital, insurers have plenty of financial leverage because of policyholder liabilities.
4LSeeMoss (1996).
26pools. This strengthens the need for regulation and can create a kind of vicious cycle in
market vs. regulatory incentives.
From an economist's perspective, such ex-post financing should be viewed as a form of
market failure. The federal government cannot credibly commit not to fund disasters
after the fact: even if it says it will not provide disaster relief ex ante, the political
incentives to do so ex post are overwhelming. Given this, the demand for purchasing an
insurance contract is reduced.
It is therefore clear how ex-post financing affects the price and quantity of reinsurance.
The effect on quantity is strongly negative, for both insurance and reinsurance. As with
explanation 6, ex-post intervention by third parties cannot explain why prices are high. It
can, however, explain why insurers perceive that reinsurance prices are high.It can also
explain low quantities of high-layer reinsurance and the cyclical downturns in quantities
after major events.
4.8. Explanation 8: Behavioral factors dampen demand
A commonly cited reason for the low quantity of high-layer reinsurance is that the
perceived likelihood that reinsurance will pay is too low to matter. For those who use
expected utility-based or profit-maximization approaches —suchas that in section 2.1
above —insuranceagainst severe, low-probability events is most valuable. But
behavioralists have suggested that expected utility approaches fail to describe decision
making.
One important failure is that people discount too heavily events they cannot readily
perceive. For example, a famous study from the 1970s shows that the rate of smoking is
higher among the general populace than among doctors (general practitioners), higher
among general practitioners than among internists, and higher amonginternists than
among specialists who work directly with lung cancer patients.Even when the
consequences and probabilities of bad outcomes are well known,it takes repeated
hammering home of bad outcomes to affect behavior.42
A second behavioral effect is that individuals often seem "ambiguity" averse. A lack of
clarity about the risks and events being insured may lead insurers and reinsurers to set
premiums high.43 Behaviorally, people seem to distinguish between risk (where
probabilities are known) and uncertainty (where they are not). Uncertainty is inherently
more ambiguous, and surveys suggest that individuals charge more to bear it.
42SeeTamerin and Resnik (1972) and Kunreuther et al (1978).
See Howard Kunreuther, Robin Hogarth, and Jacqueline Meszaros, "Insurer ambiguity and market
failure," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7:71-87 (1993).
275. Conclusions
This paper has shown that reinsurance premiums are coming down and that the market is
becoming more competitive, while capacity is increasingly available since the time of
Hurricane Andrew. With time, USAA and other firms have begun purchasing more
coverage for the largest events. So the movement is in the direction predicted by our
model. Indeed, it is interesting to ask what, in equilibrium, determines the probability
level beyond which reinsurance becomes uneconomic. All of the explanations we explore
would seem to have a role in this.
What important lessons can we take from the evidence? After all, the cat risk market is
small —tradednotional exposures probably are in the (low) hundreds of billions, not the
trillions as in major credit, mortgage prepayment, and straight debt markets.
First, we learn something about capital markets and intermediary structure. It is clear
from what we have seen that securitization is not automatically the lowest-cost way to
transfer risk. Why is this? Principals with wealth often hire dedicated agents to manage
their portfolio. If there are corporate taxes then it makes sense to install the agent as the
manager of a mutual fund pass—through that buys securities but pays no taxes. However,
if there are no corporate income taxes, then there is little difference between a mutual
fund buying securities and a corporate reinsurer underwriting reinsurance. Thus, it isn't
so wrong to think of reinsurers in tax havens as investment advisors for infinitely-lived
closed-end mutual funds. From a capital markets perspective, there is nothing
dramatically inefficient with this, provided that the principals care little about the
liquidity of this small part of their portfolio, and therefore are indifferent to the liquidity
of reinsurance contracts versus cat bonds. From a corporate perspective, the closed-end
fund version avoids costs of financial distress, but it must distribute its income, and
therefore cannot legally achieve the tax-free compounding available to Bermudan
reinsurers.
Second, we learn something about corporate risk management. Because managers of
insurance companies purchase reinsurance at far above the fair price, they clearly must
believe that risk management adds value. This statement is not easy to make in other
markets, since it is so hard to measure the value of corporate risk management, and since
Modigliani Miller can accommodate any risk management policy when prices are fair.
Of course, these conclusions follow from the assertion that fair prices can be more
credibly measured for cat events than for other, less objectively-modeled exposures.
Finally, the facts support the idea that there are capital market imperfections or barriers to
capital entering into reinsurance. Cat bonds tend to lower, but not eliminate, these
barriers. This may be because of friction capital-raising costs, but also because it is
difficult to remove transparency in new products without an investment of time and
energy on the part of investors. As a result, cat premiums may continue to decline, but it
is unlikely they will permanently reach the level of expected loss.
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Calculation of premium to expected loss
for Layer 2
ROL of Layer 2: 12.5%










* Rumorsin the market were that Layer 5wouldcost approximately 5%ROLfor traditional reinsurance
(private communication with Guy Carpenter, Inc. brokers.)
With the exception of the top layer reinsured by Residential Re, the premiums and illustrative ROLs
shown in this exhibit are nottheprices and rates paid by USAA. Due to the sensitive nature of the
information, only illustrative rates have been provided.
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1 $24.4mm 7.5%Table 1Residential Reinsurance, Cat Bond Contract Specifications
Obligor: Residential Reinsurance Limited, a Cayman Island reinsurance company, whose
sole purpose is to provide reinsurance for USAA
Amount: Class A-i: $164mm$87mm principal variable
$77mm principal protected
Class A-2: $3 13mm 100% principal variable
Yield: LIBOR +576 basispoints
Loss Occurrence: One Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane
Reinsurance
Agreement: Residential Reinsurance Limited will enter into a reinsurance agreement with
USAA to cover approximately 80% of the $SOOmm layer of risk in the excess of
the first $ 1,000mm of USAA's Ultimate Net Loss
Ultimate Net Loss: Ultimate Net Loss =amountcalculated in Step 6 (below)
Step I All losses under existing policies and renewals
Step 2 All losses under new policies
Step 3 9% of the amount calculated in Step 1
Step 4 Add the amount from Step I with the lesser of Step 2 & 3
Step 5 Multiply Step 4 by 1.02 for boat and marine policies
Step 6 Multiply Step 5by1.02 to represent loss adjustments
Coverage Type: Single occurrence
Coverage Period: June 16, 1997 to June 14, 1998 (see Figure 2b)
Ratings: Class A-I: Rated AAAr/Aaa/AAA!AAA
by S&P, Moody's, Fitch, and D&P, respectively
Class A-2: Principal variable notes are rated BB/BaIBB/BB
by S&P, Moody's, Fitch, and D&P, respectively
Covered States: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas, Vermont, and Virginia
32Figure 2a Structure of the 1997 Residential Re Transaction
Source: Goldman Sachs.
Figure 2b Time Line for Residential Re Contracts
June 16,1997 -June 14,1998 June 15, 1998 -Dec15, 1998
RiskPeriod Extended Claims
Period
June 1 Dec1 June 1 Dec1
Typical Hurricane Seasons
Source:Residential Re offering memorandum.
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$477mm tuñtyardFigure 3 Estimated Probabilities of Hurricane Losses for USAA ($mm -fromsimulations)45




46"1-P"in column two and on the graph's y-axis represents the annual probability that a catastrophic loss

















are Greater Than Total Losses
Amounts in Column 3 1-P (not additive)
(1) (2)
10.00% 90.00% $ 242 $ 20 $ 8 $ 6
5.00% 95.00% 400 32 16 10
2.00% 98.00% 674 50 33 18
1.00% 99.00% 986 66 55 29
0.96% 99.04% 1,004 68 58 29
0.40% 99.60% 1,464 92 95 43
0.39% 99.61% 1,496 93 95 43
0.20% 99.80% 1,845 119 138 61


































Notes: Graph shows the value of the percentage excess return of Berkshire Hathaway's market
capitalization in excess of the S&P 500. Announcement date is the first day onwhich news of
National Indemnity's reinsurance contract with the California Earthquake Authority is reflectedin
the closing stock price.
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11/21/96Table 2 Residential Reinsurance Transaction Comparison
Issue 1999 1998 1997
Exceedence Loss $1.0billion $1.0 billion $1.0 billion
Exhaustion Loss $1.5 billion $1.5 billion $1.5 billion
Risk Capital $200 million $450 million $400 million
Premium 3.66% 4.13% 5.76%
Expected Loss 0.44% 0.52% 0.63%
Premium / Expected Loss 8.3 7.9 9.1
Attachment Probability 0.76% 0.87% 0.96%
Exhaustion Probability 0.26% 0.32% 0.42%
USAA Coinsurance 10% 10% 20%
Coverage Period 52 weeks 50 weeks 52 weeks
Extended Claims Period 6 months 6 months 6 months
Defeasance Period not applicable not applicable 10 years
Interest Payments Quarterly Quarterly Monthly
S&P Rating BB BB BB
Source: Residential Re Offering Memoranda.
36Table 3 Effect of AIR Model Updates on USAA Expected Losses
(a)
Estimated Annual Occurrence Losses (S millions)
(12/31/98 exposure, no demand surge included)
Estimated Probability 1997 1999 % Change
Of Occurrence Model Model in Losses
200 basis points $600 $564 -5.9%
100 basis points $831 $751 -9.7%
40 basis points 1,239 1,066 -14.0%
20 basis points 1,431 1,377 -3.8%
10 basis points 1,776 1,603 -9.8%
(b)
Effect of Demand Surge Changes
Estimated Annual Occurrence Losses ($millions)
(12/31/98 exposures, 1999 models)
Using 1997 Using 1999 % Change in Losses
Estimated Probability Demand Surge Demand Surge Due to Changes
Of Occurrence Function Function in Demand Surge
200 basis points 654 641 -2.0%
100 basis points 868 849 -2.2%
40 basis points 1,283 1,240 -3.4%
20 basis points 1,689 1,633 -3.3%
10 basis points 2,039 1,962 -3.7%
Source: Residential Re Offering Memorandum, May 1999.







Note: Shaded region indicates the area in which a company would hedge, if given the choice of
range over which it could fully insure against losses at fair value.
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39Figure 7 Price level of reinsurance contracts relative to actuarial value, 1989-1998
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nnihahiIitvTable 4 Changes In Reinsurance Premiums And Quantities Purchased Subsequent To Hurricane
Andrew
(a) Southeast exposure (b) Hurricane exposure
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
exposureLMn(p,)iMn(q,) exposureln(p,1)zin(q1)
5most-exposedinsurers 0.141 0.415 -0.021 0.184 0.583 -0.082
5least-exposedinsurers 0.000 0.335 -0.013 0.112 0.336 -0.047
Comparison of price responses in the year after Hurricane Andrew (8/20/92—8/19/93) for different insurers.
Panel (a) contrasts insurers that have high and low exposure to the Southeast (as measured by market
share). Panel (b) contrasts insurers that have high and low exposure to hurricanes. The table shows the
mean exposure and the mean price change of the 5mostextreme contracts in each case. The mean price
change for the insurers with lesser exposure to the Southeast is calculated using all 14 of the insurers that
have zero market share in that region.
40